Cognitive Symptoms of Post-COVID-19 Condition and Daily Functioning.

Importance: The frequent occurrence of cognitive symptoms in post-COVID-19 condition has been described, but the nature of these symptoms and their demographic and functional factors are not well characterized in generalizable populations. Objective: To investigate the prevalence of self-reported cognitive symptoms in post-COVID-19 condition, in comparison with individuals with prior acute SARS-CoV-2 infection who did not develop post-COVID-19 condition, and their association with other individual features, including depressive symptoms and functional status. Design, Setting, and Participants: Two waves of a 50-state nonprobability population-based internet survey conducted between December 22, 2022, and May 5, 2023. Participants included survey respondents aged 18 years and older. Exposure: Post-COVID-19 condition, defined as self-report of symptoms attributed to COVID-19 beyond 2 months after the initial month of illness. Main Outcomes and Measures: Seven items from the Neuro-QoL cognition battery assessing the frequency of cognitive symptoms in the past week and patient Health Questionnaire-9. Results: The 14 767 individuals reporting test-confirmed COVID-19 illness at least 2 months before the survey had a mean (SD) age of 44.6 (16.3) years; 568 (3.8%) were Asian, 1484 (10.0%) were Black, 1408 (9.5%) were Hispanic, and 10 811 (73.2%) were White. A total of 10 037 respondents (68.0%) were women and 4730 (32.0%) were men. Of the 1683 individuals reporting post-COVID-19 condition, 955 (56.7%) reported at least 1 cognitive symptom experienced daily, compared with 3552 of 13 084 (27.1%) of those who did not report post-COVID-19 condition. More daily cognitive symptoms were associated with a greater likelihood of reporting at least moderate interference with functioning (unadjusted odds ratio [OR], 1.31 [95% CI, 1.25-1.36]; adjusted [AOR], 1.30 [95% CI, 1.25-1.36]), lesser likelihood of full-time employment (unadjusted OR, 0.95 [95% CI, 0.91-0.99]; AOR, 0.92 [95% CI, 0.88-0.96]) and greater severity of depressive symptoms (unadjusted coefficient, 1.40 [95% CI, 1.29-1.51]; adjusted coefficient 1.27 [95% CI, 1.17-1.38). After including depressive symptoms in regression models, associations were also found between cognitive symptoms and at least moderate interference with everyday functioning (AOR, 1.27 [95% CI, 1.21-1.33]) and between cognitive symptoms and lower odds of full-time employment (AOR, 0.92 [95% CI, 0.88-0.97]). Conclusions and Relevance: The findings of this survey study of US adults suggest that cognitive symptoms are common among individuals with post-COVID-19 condition and associated with greater self-reported functional impairment, lesser likelihood of full-time employment, and greater depressive symptom severity. Screening for and addressing cognitive symptoms is an important component of the public health response to post-COVID-19 condition.

Academics are more specific, and practitioners more sensitive, in forecasting interventions to strengthen democratic attitudes.

Concern over democratic erosion has led to a proliferation of proposed interventions to strengthen democratic attitudes in the United States. Resource constraints, however, prevent implementing all proposed interventions. One approach to identify promising interventions entails leveraging domain experts, who have knowledge regarding a given field, to forecast the effectiveness of candidate interventions. We recruit experts who develop general knowledge about a social problem (academics), experts who directly intervene on the problem (practitioners), and nonexperts from the public to forecast the effectiveness of interventions to reduce partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence. Comparing 14,076 forecasts submitted by 1,181 forecasters against the results of a megaexperiment (n = 32,059) that tested 75 hypothesized effects of interventions, we find that both types of experts outperformed members of the public, though experts differed in how they were accurate. While academics' predictions were more specific (i.e., they identified a larger proportion of ineffective interventions and had fewer false-positive forecasts), practitioners' predictions were more sensitive (i.e., they identified a larger proportion of effective interventions and had fewer false-negative forecasts). Consistent with this, practitioners were better at predicting best-performing interventions, while academics were superior in predicting which interventions performed worst. Our paper highlights the importance of differentiating types of experts and types of accuracy. We conclude by discussing factors that affect whether sensitive or specific forecasters are preferable, such as the relative cost of false positives and negatives and the expected rate of intervention success.

A synthesis of evidence for policy from behavioural science during COVID-19.

Scientific evidence regularly guides policy decisions1, with behavioural science increasingly part of this process2. In April 2020, an influential paper3 proposed 19 policy recommendations ('claims') detailing how evidence from behavioural science could contribute to efforts to reduce impacts and end the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we assess 747 pandemic-related research articles that empirically investigated those claims. We report the scale of evidence and whether evidence supports them to indicate applicability for policymaking. Two independent teams, involving 72 reviewers, found evidence for 18 of 19 claims, with both teams finding evidence supporting 16 (89%) of those 18 claims. The strongest evidence supported claims that anticipated culture, polarization and misinformation would be associated with policy effectiveness. Claims suggesting trusted leaders and positive social norms increased adherence to behavioural interventions also had strong empirical support, as did appealing to social consensus or bipartisan agreement. Targeted language in messaging yielded mixed effects and there were no effects for highlighting individual benefits or protecting others. No available evidence existed to assess any distinct differences in effects between using the terms 'physical distancing' and 'social distancing'. Analysis of 463 papers containing data showed generally large samples; 418 involved human participants with a mean of 16,848 (median of 1,699). That statistical power underscored improved suitability of behavioural science research for informing policy decisions. Furthermore, by implementing a standardized approach to evidence selection and synthesis, we amplify broader implications for advancing scientific evidence in policy formulation and prioritization.

Community Mobility and Depressive Symptoms During the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States.

Importance: Marked elevation in levels of depressive symptoms compared with historical norms have been described during the COVID-19 pandemic, and understanding the extent to which these are associated with diminished in-person social interaction could inform public health planning for future pandemics or other disasters. Objective: To describe the association between living in a US county with diminished mobility during the COVID-19 pandemic and self-reported depressive symptoms, while accounting for potential local and state-level confounding factors. Design, Setting, and Participants: This survey study used 18 waves of a nonprobability internet survey conducted in the United States between May 2020 and April 2022. Participants included respondents who were 18 years and older and lived in 1 of the 50 US states or Washington DC. Main Outcome and Measure: Depressive symptoms measured by the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9); county-level community mobility estimates from mobile apps; COVID-19 policies at the US state level from the Oxford stringency index. Results: The 192 271 survey respondents had a mean (SD) of age 43.1 (16.5) years, and 768 (0.4%) were American Indian or Alaska Native individuals, 11 448 (6.0%) were Asian individuals, 20 277 (10.5%) were Black individuals, 15 036 (7.8%) were Hispanic individuals, 1975 (1.0%) were Pacific Islander individuals, 138 702 (72.1%) were White individuals, and 4065 (2.1%) were individuals of another race. Additionally, 126 381 respondents (65.7%) identified as female and 65 890 (34.3%) as male. Mean (SD) depression severity by PHQ-9 was 7.2 (6.8). In a mixed-effects linear regression model, the mean county-level proportion of individuals not leaving home was associated with a greater level of depression symptoms (ß, 2.58; 95% CI, 1.57-3.58) after adjustment for individual sociodemographic features. Results were similar after the inclusion in regression models of local COVID-19 activity, weather, and county-level economic features, and persisted after widespread availability of COVID-19 vaccination. They were attenuated by the inclusion of state-level pandemic restrictions. Two restrictions, mandatory mask-wearing in public (ß, 0.23; 95% CI, 0.15-0.30) and policies cancelling public events (ß, 0.37; 95% CI, 0.22-0.51), demonstrated modest independent associations with depressive symptom severity. Conclusions and Relevance: In this study, depressive symptoms were greater in locales and times with diminished community mobility. Strategies to understand the potential public health consequences of pandemic responses are needed.

Correcting misperceptions of the other political party does not robustly reduce support for undemocratic practices or partisan violence.

A growing consensus suggests that a cause of support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence is that partisans misperceive the other side. That is, they vastly exaggerate the extent to which members of the other party support undemocratic practices and violence. When these misperceptions are corrected, citizens' own beliefs moderate. I present results from an experiment that show that misperception corrections do not have an effect in the presence of competing information (i.e., that challenges the validity of the correction or offers a conflicting narrative). Basic corrections do not constitute a robust way to counter democratic backsliding stemming from citizens' misperceptions. The results highlight the need to devise stronger misperception interventions and, more generally, to consider competing information environments when devising any scalable behavioral intervention.

Misinformation, Trust, and Use of Ivermectin and Hydroxychloroquine for COVID-19.

Importance: The COVID-19 pandemic has been notable for the widespread dissemination of misinformation regarding the virus and appropriate treatment. Objective: To quantify the prevalence of non-evidence-based treatment for COVID-19 in the US and the association between such treatment and endorsement of misinformation as well as lack of trust in physicians and scientists. Design, Setting, and Participants: This single-wave, population-based, nonprobability internet survey study was conducted between December 22, 2022, and January 16, 2023, in US residents 18 years or older who reported prior COVID-19 infection. Main Outcome and Measure: Self-reported use of ivermectin or hydroxychloroquine, endorsing false statements related to COVID-19 vaccination, self-reported trust in various institutions, conspiratorial thinking measured by the American Conspiracy Thinking Scale, and news sources. Results: A total of 13 438 individuals (mean [SD] age, 42.7 [16.1] years; 9150 [68.1%] female and 4288 [31.9%] male) who reported prior COVID-19 infection were included in this study. In this cohort, 799 (5.9%) reported prior use of hydroxychloroquine (527 [3.9%]) or ivermectin (440 [3.3%]). In regression models including sociodemographic features as well as political affiliation, those who endorsed at least 1 item of COVID-19 vaccine misinformation were more likely to receive non-evidence-based medication (adjusted odds ratio [OR], 2.86; 95% CI, 2.28-3.58). Those reporting trust in physicians and hospitals (adjusted OR, 0.74; 95% CI, 0.56-0.98) and in scientists (adjusted OR, 0.63; 95% CI, 0.51-0.79) were less likely to receive non-evidence-based medication. Respondents reporting trust in social media (adjusted OR, 2.39; 95% CI, 2.00-2.87) and in Donald Trump (adjusted OR, 2.97; 95% CI, 2.34-3.78) were more likely to have taken non-evidence-based medication. Individuals with greater scores on the American Conspiracy Thinking Scale were more likely to have received non-evidence-based medications (unadjusted OR, 1.09; 95% CI, 1.06-1.11; adjusted OR, 1.10; 95% CI, 1.07-1.13). Conclusions and Relevance: In this survey study of US adults, endorsement of misinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic, lack of trust in physicians or scientists, conspiracy-mindedness, and the nature of news sources were associated with receiving non-evidence-based treatment for COVID-19. These results suggest that the potential harms of misinformation may extend to the use of ineffective and potentially toxic treatments in addition to avoidance of health-promoting behaviors.

Norm-violating rhetoric undermines support for participatory inclusiveness and political equality among Trump supporters.

Over the last decade, the United States has seen increasing antidemocratic rhetoric by political leaders. Yet, prior work suggests that such norm-violating rhetoric does not undermine support for democracy as a system of government. We argue that, while that may be true, such rhetoric does vitiate support for specific democratic principles. We test this theory by extending prior work to assess the effects of Trump's norm-violating rhetoric on general support for democracy as well as for the principles of participatory inclusiveness, contestation, the rule of law, and political equality. We find that Trump's rhetoric does not alter attitudes toward democracy as a preferred system but does reduce support for inclusiveness and equality among his supporters. Our findings suggest that elite rhetoric can undermine basic principles of American democracy.

Media use and vaccine resistance.

Public health requires collective action-the public best addresses health crises when individuals engage in prosocial behaviors. Failure to do so can have dire societal and economic consequences. This was made clear by the disjointed, politicized response to COVID-19 in the United States. Perhaps no aspect of the pandemic exemplified this challenge more than the sizeable percentage of individuals who delayed or refused vaccination. While scholars, practitioners, and the government devised a range of communication strategies to persuade people to get vaccinated, much less attention has been paid to where the unvaccinated could be reached. We address this question using multiple waves of a large national survey as well as various secondary data sets. We find that the vaccine resistant seems to predictably obtain information from conservative media outlets (e.g. Fox News) while the vaccinated congregate around more liberal outlets (e.g. MSNBC). We also find consistent evidence that vaccine-resistant individuals often obtain COVID-19 information from various social media, most notably Facebook, rather than traditional media sources. Importantly, such individuals tend to exhibit low institutional trust. While our results do not suggest a failure of sites such as Facebook's institutional COVID-19 efforts, as the counterfactual of no efforts is unknown, they do highlight an opportunity to reach those who are less likely to take vital actions in the service of public health.

Correcting misperceptions of out-partisans decreases American legislators' support for undemocratic practices.

There is substantial concern about democratic backsliding in the United States. Evidence includes notably high levels of animosity toward out-partisans and support for undemocratic practices (SUP) among the general public. Much less is known, however, about the views of elected officials-even though they influence democratic outcomes more directly. In a survey experiment conducted with state legislators (N = 534), we show that these officials exhibit less animosity toward the other party, less SUP, and less support for partisan violence (SPV) than the general public. However, legislators vastly overestimate the levels of animosity, SUP, and SPV among voters from the other party (though not among voters from their own party). Further, those legislators randomly assigned to receive accurate information about the views of voters from the other party reported significantly lower SUP and marginally significantly lower partisan animosity toward the other party. This suggests that legislators' democratic attitudes are causally linked to their perceptions of other-party voters' democratic attitudes. Our findings highlight the importance of ensuring that office holders have access to reliable information about voters from both parties.

A 50-state survey study of thoughts of suicide and social isolation among older adults in the United States.

BACKGROUND: We aimed to characterize the prevalence of social disconnection and thoughts of suicide among older adults in the United States, and examine the association between them in a large naturalistic study. METHODS: We analyzed data from 6 waves of a fifty-state non-probability survey among US adults conducted between February and December 2021. The internet-based survey collected the PHQ-9, as well as multiple measures of social connectedness. We applied multiple logistic regression to analyze the association between presence of thoughts of suicide and social disconnection. Exploratory analysis, using generalized random forests, examined heterogeneity of effects across sociodemographic groups. RESULTS: Of 16,164 survey respondents age 65 and older, mean age was 70.9 (SD 5.0); the cohort was 61.4 % female and 29.6 % male; 2.0 % Asian, 6.7 % Black, 2.2 % Hispanic, and 86.8 % White. A total of 1144 (7.1 %) reported thoughts of suicide at least several days in the prior 2 week period. In models adjusted for sociodemographic features, households with 3 or more additional members (adjusted OR 1.73, 95 % CI 1.28-2.33) and lack of social supports, particularly emotional supports (adjusted OR 2.60, 95 % CI 2.09-3.23), were independently associated with greater likelihood of reporting such thoughts, as was greater reported loneliness (adjusted OR 1.75, 95 % CI 1.64-1.87). The effects of emotional support varied significantly across sociodemographic groups. CONCLUSIONS: Thoughts of suicide are common among older adults in the US, and associated with lack of social support, but not with living alone. TRIAL REGISTRATION: NA.

Interventions reducing affective polarization do not necessarily improve anti-democratic attitudes.

There is widespread concern that rising affective polarization-particularly dislike for outpartisans-exacerbates Americans' anti-democratic attitudes. Accordingly, scholars and practitioners alike have invested great effort in developing depolarization interventions that reduce affective polarization. Critically, however, it remains unclear whether these interventions reduce anti-democratic attitudes, or only change sentiments towards outpartisans. Here we address this question with experimental tests (total n = 8,385) of three previously established depolarization interventions: correcting misperceptions of outpartisans, priming inter-partisan friendships and observing warm cross-partisan interactions between political leaders. While these depolarization interventions reliably reduced affective polarization, we do not find compelling evidence that these interventions reduced support for undemocratic candidates, support for partisan violence or prioritizing partisan ends over democratic means. Thus, future efforts to strengthen pro-democratic attitudes may do better if they target these outcomes directly. More broadly, these findings call into question the previously assumed causal effect of affective polarization on anti-democratic attitudes.

Cognitive-motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts.

Healthy democratic polities feature competing visions of a good society but also require some level of cooperation and institutional trust. Democracy is at risk when citizens become so polarized that an 'us versus them' mentality dominates. Despite a vast multidisciplinary literature, no coherent conceptual framework of the microlevel dynamics that increase or decrease polarization has been presented. In this Review, we provide a conceptual framework to integrate scientific knowledge about cognitive-motivational mechanisms that influence political polarization and the social-communicative contexts in which they are enacted. Ego-justifying and group-justifying motives lead individuals to defend their own pre-existing beliefs and those of their in-group, respectively. However, a distinct class of system-justifying motives contributes to asymmetric forms of polarization. Whereas conservative-rightist ideology is associated with valuing tradition, social order and maintenance of the status quo, liberal-leftist ideology is associated with a push for egalitarian social change. These cognitive-motivational mechanisms interact with social influence processes linked to communication source, message and channel factors, all of which might contribute to increased or decreased polarization. We conclude with a discussion of unanswered questions and ways in which our framework can be extended to the study of culture and institutions.

Correcting inaccurate metaperceptions reduces Americans' support for partisan violence.

Scholars, policy makers, and the general public have expressed growing concern about the possibility of large-scale political violence in the United States. Prior research substantiates these worries, as studies reveal that many American partisans support the use of violence against rival partisans. Here, we propose that support for partisan violence is based in part on greatly exaggerated perceptions of rival partisans' support for violence. We also predict that correcting these inaccurate "metaperceptions" can reduce partisans' own support for partisan violence. We test these hypotheses in a series of preregistered, nationally representative, correlational, longitudinal, and experimental studies (total n = 4,741) collected both before and after the 2020 US presidential election and the 2021 US Capitol attack. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that both Democrats' and Republicans' perceptions of their rival partisans' support for violence and willingness to engage in violence were very inaccurate, with estimates ranging from 245 to 442% higher than actual levels. Further, we found that a brief, informational correction of these misperceptions reduced support for violence by 34% (Study 3) and willingness to engage in violence by 44% (Study 4). In the latter study, a follow-up survey revealed that the correction continued to significantly reduce support for violence approximately 1 mo later. Together, these results suggest that support for partisan violence in the United States stems in part from systematic overestimations of rival partisans' support for violence and that correcting these misperceptions can durably reduce support for partisan violence in the mass public.

Elite party cues increase vaccination intentions among Republicans.

Overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic requires motivating the vast majority of Americans to get vaccinated. However, vaccination rates have become politically polarized, and a substantial proportion of Republicans have remained vaccine hesitant for months. Here, we explore how endorsements by party elites affect Republicans' COVID-19 vaccination intentions and attitudes. In a preregistered survey experiment (n = 1,480), we varied whether self-identified Republicans saw endorsements of the vaccine from prominent Republicans (including video of a speech by former President Donald Trump), from the Democratic Party (including video of a speech by President Joseph Biden), or a neutral control condition including no endorsements. Unvaccinated Republicans who were exposed to the Republican elite endorsement reported 7.0% higher vaccination intentions than those who viewed the Democratic elite endorsement and 5.7% higher than those in the neutral control condition. These effects were statistically mediated by participants' reports of how much they thought Republican politicians would want them to get vaccinated. We also found evidence of backlash effects against Democratic elites: Republicans who viewed the Democratic elite endorsement reported they would be significantly less likely to encourage others to vaccinate and had more negative attitudes toward the vaccine, compared with those who viewed the Republican elite endorsement or the neutral control. These results demonstrate the relative advantage of cues from Republican elites-and the risks of messaging from Democrats currently in power-for promoting vaccination among the largest vaccine-hesitant subgroup in the United States.

Affective polarization, local contexts and public opinion in America.

Affective polarization has become a defining feature of twenty-first-century US politics, but we do not know how it relates to citizens' policy opinions. Answering this question has fundamental implications not only for understanding the political consequences of polarization, but also for understanding how citizens form preferences. Under most political circumstances, this is a difficult question to answer, but the novel coronavirus pandemic allows us to understand how partisan animus contributes to opinion formation. Using a two-wave panel that spans the outbreak of COVID-19, we find a strong association between citizens' levels of partisan animosity and their attitudes about the pandemic, as well as the actions they take in response to it. This relationship, however, is more muted in areas with severe outbreaks of the disease. Our results make clear that narrowing of issue divides requires not only policy discourse but also addressing affective partisan hostility.

Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response.

The COVID-19 pandemic represents a massive global health crisis. Because the crisis requires large-scale behaviour change and places significant psychological burdens on individuals, insights from the social and behavioural sciences can be used to help align human behaviour with the recommendations of epidemiologists and public health experts. Here we discuss evidence from a selection of research topics relevant to pandemics, including work on navigating threats, social and cultural influences on behaviour, science communication, moral decision-making, leadership, and stress and coping. In each section, we note the nature and quality of prior research, including uncertainty and unsettled issues. We identify several insights for effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic and highlight important gaps researchers should move quickly to fill in the coming weeks and months.

Racial bias in sport medical staff's perceptions of others' pain.

Unequal treatment based on race is well documented in higher education and healthcare settings. In the present work, we examine racial bias at the intersection of these domains: racial bias in pain-related perceptions among National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division 1 sport medical staff. Using experimental vignettes about a student-athlete who injured his/her anterior cruciate ligament (ACL), we find, like prior work, that respondents perceived Black (vs. White) targets as having higher initial pain tolerance. Moreover, this bias was mediated by perceptions of social class. We extend prior work by showing racial bias was not evident on other outcome measures, including perception of recovery process pain, likelihood of over-reporting pain, and over-use of drugs to combat pain. This suggests stricter boundary conditions on bias in pain perceptions than had been previously recognized.